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I. INTRODUCTION 
Judge Ginsburg’s address on how to balance unquantified 
benefits and harms under the consumer welfare standard 
highlights two distinct roles for qualitative assessment. The 
first is the role of qualitative evidence in antitrust analyses. 
The second is the consideration of both price and non-price 
effects. While these two topics are related—e.g., analysis of 
 
* Vice Presidents, Charles River Associates. The views and opinions 
expressed herein are those of the authors and do not reflect or represent the 
views of Charles River Associates, their clients, or any organizations with 
which the authors are affiliated. A version of this paper was delivered as the 
William Howard Taft Lecture, September 27, 2019, to the New York State Bar 
Association, Antitrust Law Section. 
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non-price competitive effects often relies on qualitative 
evidence—they raise distinct issues. We provide an economic 
perspective on these topics as a complement to Judge 
Ginsburg’s learned legal commentary. Specifically, we explain 
the central role that sound qualitative evidence traditionally 
and properly plays in the economic analysis of both price and 
non-price effects of mergers and accused conduct. We also 
discuss the state of economic analysis when a broad economic 
interpretation of the consumer welfare standard would 
require balancing the welfare of one group against another. 
We see Judge Ginsburg’s thesis as captured in the 
following passage of his remarks:  
Meeting the challenge of balancing qualitative harms 
or benefits in an antitrust case is not a reason to 
depart from the consumer welfare standard.  On the 
contrary, this balancing exercise requires an evidence-
based approach to incorporating into the consumer 
welfare standard those qualitative effects—both 
anticompetitive harms and procompetitive benefits—
of a restraint of trade.1 
Judge Ginsburg further elaborates on the evidentiary 
demands of this approach as follows: 
For a claimed competitive harm or benefit that 
remains unquantified, the decisionmaker should 
demand both a convincing showing that the 
magnitude of the effect cannot be quantified and a 
sound theoretical basis for nonetheless believing the 
effect will be real and substantial.2 
We agree entirely with these principles and will offer some 
comments on how economists operationalize the challenges of 
assessing competitive effects using qualitative as well as, if 
available, quantitative evidence. 
However, there is one point on which we will argue that 
Judge Ginsburg perhaps unduly limits the role of economic 
 
1 Douglas H. Ginsburg, Balancing Unquantified Harms and Benefits in 
Antitrust Cases Under the Consumer Welfare Standard, 2019 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 824, 845 (2019). 
2 Id.  
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analysis and the breadth of the consumer welfare standard. 
Judge Ginsburg offers: 
There have been calls for antitrust enforcers and 
courts to consider all manner of other criteria in 
addition to the welfare of consumers. Doing so would 
require making complex tradeoffs among 
incommensurable goals, without any principled way 
to do so. The effect would be to place unbridled and 
unreviewable discretion in the hands of enforcers and 
courts, inviting arbitrary decisions and creating 
uncertainty for firms.  Accepting nebulous theories of 
harm (such as the “accumulation of political power”), 
and by parity of reasoning, vague “public interest” 
defenses (such as a claim that an agreement among 
rivals would reduce economic inequality) would lead 
to inconsistent results and evade the rule of law.3 
As we will discuss in these remarks, positing that public 
interest considerations are separate or excluded from 
consumer welfare effects of a merger or accused conduct is 
difficult to defend from an economic perspective. Specifically, 
public interest considerations and other potentially nebulous 
factors also affect consumer welfare broadly conceived. 
Therefore, they cannot, as a matter of principle, be considered 
separate from economists’ general notion of consumer welfare. 
II. THE ROLE OF QUALITATIVE EVIDENCE 
The role of qualitative evidence in antitrust analysis may 
seem like an odd topic for economists. We are more often 
associated with econometric analyses and complex theoretical 
models than with the assessment of qualitative evidence. 
While antitrust economists do frequently rely on highly 
technical analyses, these are a means towards a more 
fundamental purpose: to understand the incentives faced by 
firms, their customers, and consumers, given the costs and 
benefits of their choices. 
To achieve that end, economic analysis does not 
exclusively, or even primarily, rely on quantitative evidence. 
 
3 Id. at 826–27 (footnotes omitted). 
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Whether an analysis in a particular case best relies on 
qualitative evidence or a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative evidence depends on the facts of the case. 
Indeed, while one could, in principle, undertake a robust 
antitrust analysis based purely on qualitative evidence, it is 
almost inconceivable that one could do so based purely on 
quantitative evidence. The reason is simple: economic data 
analyses are built on models that try to capture the salient 
features of the factual circumstances, but with sufficient 
simplifications to make the analysis tractable. As a result, 
qualitative evidence is not only a complement to quantitative 
analysis, it is also the foundation upon which empirical 
analyses are built. One cannot begin to identify and formulate 
the proper quantitative analysis using economic methods 
without first performing a qualitative analysis of the available 
evidence regarding which products compete with each other, 
how prices are determined in the market, who the suppliers 
are, and other relevant facts governing the marketplace. 
A. Challenges in Assessing Qualitative Evidence 
Assessments of qualitative evidence raise particular 
challenges that do not arise in quantitative analyses. For 
example, the economics literature has developed a variety of 
techniques to estimate values of interest, and to quantify the 
precision of those empirical estimates through concepts such 
as standard errors and confidence intervals.4 For qualitative 
evidence, there is no direct equivalent for assessing precision. 
Instead, one must rely on a range of techniques to infer the 
informative value of qualitative evidence. 
When assessing qualitative evidence, it is important to 
consider how, why, and when that piece of evidence was 
originally created. For example, is it likely that the author of 
a given document was in a position, and had the requisite 
experience, to reliably assess the topic at hand? Often, a key 
issue is whether the author of a document had an incentive to 
describe the situation accurately. Moreover, even if an 
 
4 See generally WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 51–56 (6th 
ed. 2008) (explaining standard errors and confidence intervals). 
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assessment was accurate when made, it is important to 
consider whether the competitive situation has since changed 
or is likely to change such that the original assessment may 
not apply in the future. Especially in rapidly changing 
industries, the relevance of particular competitive factors may 
change over time. 
In many cases, some qualitative evidence will point in one 
direction on a given issue, while other evidence will suggest 
otherwise. This does not mean that qualitative evidence is not 
useful or should not be relied upon. Instead, one should try to 
assess a range of evidence to determine what is most likely to 
be true. By reviewing a wide range of qualitative evidence, 
individually imprecise elements can be aggregated, albeit 
informally rather than numerically, resulting in an informed 
opinion on a given issue. This is one reason why it is valuable 
for the economic expert to contribute early to the discovery 
process. 
Although rigorous and relevant quantitative analysis is 
the gold standard in some circumstances where it is feasible 
to perform, there are circumstances in which an insistence on 
quantitative evidence is counterproductive. Quantitative 
analysis based on inadequate or inappropriate data may have 
little informative value. Nevertheless, it may create the 
impression of precision that it does not deserve, and attract 
weight that its merit does not bear. An absolute requirement 
that all effects be quantified would likely result in bad 
analysis trumping no analysis, or in dueling bad analyses, in 
both cases to the detriment of sound decisionmaking. When 
reliable quantitative analysis is not feasible, sound 
decisionmaking can be based on qualitative evidence about 
the existence and likely magnitude of qualitative effects if that 
evidence is sufficiently rigorous, robust, and relevant under 
the theory being assessed. 
B. Balancing Pro- and Anticompetitive Effects 
Weighing whether the magnitude of procompetitive effects 
is likely to exceed the magnitude of anticompetitive effects can 
be challenging even when such effects are quantifiable. Of 
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course, this comparison is all the more difficult when pro- and 
anticompetitive effects cannot be quantified. 
One potential approach in this situation is to assess 
whether pro- or anticompetitive effects are likely to be 
significant. Even in instances where the magnitudes of such 
effects are not measurable, one may still be able to infer 
whether they are likely significant based on the extent to 
which such issues are discussed in the ordinary course of 
business, or from strategic actions taken in anticipation of 
such effects, for example. In some cases, only anticompetitive 
effects are likely significant, with procompetitive effects not 
likely significant, or vice versa. In this situation, one can 
reasonably conclude that either the pro- or anticompetitive 
effects of a given conduct are likely to dominate even if those 
effects cannot readily be quantified. 
The situation is more complicated, of course, when both 
pro- and anticompetitive effects are likely significant. In such 
circumstances, economists often rely on indirect methods for 
determining which effect is likely to have the predominant 
effect on consumer welfare. 
One option is to consider evidence gathered from prior 
similar examples of alleged anticompetitive conduct. For 
example, in the merger context one might consider the effect 
of prior acquisitions made by the same firms or by other firms 
in the same industry.5 While differences between acquisitions 
can mitigate the validity of such comparisons, and one must 
take care to consider key factors that may lead to significantly 
different effects for different transactions, this approach can 
still be informative. 
III. PRICE AND NON-PRICE EFFECTS OF 
ALLEGED ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT 
Alleged anticompetitive conduct may result in three types 
of consequences. The first consists of price effects for the set 
 
5 For an example of this approach, see Deborah Haas-Wilson & 
Christopher Garmon, Hospital Mergers and Competitive Effects: Two 
Retrospective Analyses, 18 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 17 (2011) (discussing two 
retrospective studies of hospital mergers).  
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of products at issue. The second consists of non-price effects, 
such as product quality, that impact consumer demand for the 
set of products at issue. The third type of effect consists of 
price and non-price effects related to consumer demand 
outside of the set of products at issue. A comparison of these 
three types of effects illustrates how the economics literature 
has dealt with some of the issues highlighted in Judge 
Ginsburg’s address. 
A. Price Effects 
Price and volume of sales are often the primary focus in 
antitrust analyses. It is natural to focus on such financial 
effects because their implications for consumer welfare are 
clear. That is, generally speaking, consumer welfare is 
reduced by higher prices or reductions in the quantity 
purchased of the desired products.6 
B. Non-Price Effects Related to Consumer Demand for 
the Products at Issue 
The cases discussed by Judge Ginsburg implicate non-price 
as well as price and quantity effects. A standard approach in 
the economics literature is to model products as collections of 
characteristics.7 One characteristic is price, while other 
product characteristics capture what economists think of as 
dimensions of product quality, broadly defined.8 
Economic models of consumer demand often combine price 
and non-price competition based on the following paradigm. 
Consumers have preferences over both price and non-price 
product characteristics, and select from the set of available 
products the one that provides the highest net consumer 
 
6 See generally HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 94–112 (3d 
ed. 1992) (explaining conditions under which consumer utility is non-
increasing in price, holding other factors constant). 
7 See generally Kevin J. Lancaster, A New Approach to Consumer 
Theory, 74 J. POL. ECON. 132, 133–37 (1966).  
8 Id. 
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surplus after accounting for the price of the product.9 A key 
implication of this paradigm is that, for a given consumer, 
substitution occurs in response to non-price as well as price 
factors. This is because the consumer does not choose products 
based solely on price, or solely on non-price factors, but rather 
on the overall attractiveness of the bundle of price and non-
price attributes.10 
The effects of competition on price and non-price attributes 
are, therefore, intrinsically linked, but they do not always pull 
in the same direction. Indeed, non-price effects may have the 
opposite impact on consumer welfare of the price effects (or 
even other non-price effects); for example, if price is expected 
to rise but so is quality, or if product durability is expected to 
rise but convenience of purchase is expected to fall. In these 
cases, the decisionmaker is confronted with the necessity of 
balancing countervailing effects on consumer welfare against 
each other. While clearly more realistic than a price-only 
framework in which all other product characteristics are held 
fixed, this generalized framework raises a number of 
conceptual and practical challenges. 
First, allegedly anticompetitive conduct could, in principle, 
affect several price and non-price characteristics. 
Consequently, a general analysis of such conduct may present 
a high-dimensionality problem, given that even relatively 
simple products may have many characteristics. 
Second, it is important to recognize that price and non-
price characteristics are not independently determined but 
rather are mutually determined. The optimal (profit 
maximizing) set of product characteristics will typically 
depend on the price the firm can charge for the product with 
those characteristics, and the optimal price will depend on the 
product’s characteristics. Often, the firm’s profit maximizing 
price will be higher for products with characteristics that 
 
9 See, e.g., Steven Berry et al., Automobile Prices in Market 
Equilibrium, 63 ECONOMETRICA 841, 844–51 (1995). See also Aviv Nevo, A 
Practitioner’s Guide to Estimation of Random-Coefficients Logit Models of 
Demand, 9 J. ECON. MGMT. STRATEGY 513, 516–21 (2000).  
10 Id. 
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consumers demand more highly (all else being equal). 
Consequently, one cannot assess the procompetitive impact of 
quality changes in isolation of price changes. 
While a potential defense of allegedly anticompetitive 
merger effects, for example, is that the merger will result in a 
higher quality product (or other non-price consumer benefits), 
the value of any such benefits must be weighed against the 
price effects. A higher price is bad for consumers, but higher 
quality is good, at least for some consumers. Whether 
consumers are better off on a net basis depends on whether 
the quality-adjusted price has gone up or down.  
The hospital merger case discussed by Judge Ginsburg, 
Saint Alphonsus Medical Center-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s 
Health System, Ltd., raised this specific issue. While the 
district court disallowed the merger on the grounds that the 
quality-related efficiencies were not merger specific,11 the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that, even if the quality effects were 
unavailable without the merger, showing an increase in 
quality would not be sufficient to justify it.12 Specifically, the 
court found:  
But even if we assume that the claimed efficiencies 
were merger-specific, the defense would nonetheless 
fail. At most, the district court concluded that St. 
Luke’s might provide better service to patients after 
the merger. That is a laudable goal, but the Clayton 
Act does not excuse mergers that lessen competition 
or create monopolies simply because the merged 
entity can improve its operations. . . . The district 
court did not clearly err in concluding that whatever 
else St. Luke’s proved, it did not demonstrate that 
efficiencies resulting from the merger would have a 
positive effect on competition.13 
 
11 Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., 
Ltd., Nos. 1:12-CV-00560-BLW, 1:13-CV-00116-BLW, 2014 WL 407446, at 
*12 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2014).  
12 Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., 
Ltd., 778 F.3d 775, 791–92 (9th Cir. 2015).  
13 Id. (citation omitted). 
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The appropriate economic analysis consistent with the 
consumer welfare standard considers whether efficiencies 
increase consumer welfare enough to offset the negative effect 
of higher prices on consumer welfare. The justification for 
promoting competition is, as Judge Ginsburg said, to advance 
consumer welfare. Quality of service directly affects consumer 
welfare—indeed, in health care, quality of service is central to 
the determination. Hence, it is necessary, from an economic 
standpoint, to consider both price and quality effects when 
determining whether a merger would advance consumer 
welfare. 
While often difficult to put into practice, weighing price 
and quality effects centers on a straightforward question: are 
consumers better off under the post-merger combination of 
price and quality compared to the pre-merger combination of 
price and quality? When undertaking such an analysis it 
would be relevant to assess, if possible, whether, on a net 
basis, the total quantity of sales would increase or decrease as 
a result of the merger. If the net effect of the price and quality 
increases would be to increase the volume of sales, then that 
should create a rebuttable presumption that social welfare 
will go up with the consummation of the merger. If the net 
effect would be a reduction in volume of sales, the rebuttable 
presumption should be that consumer welfare will go down.  
It may not be feasible to predict reliably whether the net 
effect of changes in price and quality would be an increase or 
decrease in the volume of sales. In that case, it would be useful 
to consider several factors, which we refer to as magnitude, 
likelihood, and risk.  
Regarding magnitude, it is relevant to consider whether, 
when effects cannot be quantified, there is evidence of relative 
orders of magnitude. As discussed earlier, qualitative 
evidence may allow an inference regarding which effects are 
likely to be significantly larger than others even in cases 
where the precise size of those effects cannot be quantified. 
Regarding likelihood, one should consider how persuasive 
the evidence is on price increases, and how persuasive the 
evidence is on quality increases. Where the likelihood of an 
effect is relatively low, or the evidence is relatively weak, the 
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magnitude of the effect should be discounted when attempting 
to weigh countervailing effects.  
Regarding risk, it is relevant to assess the effects of type 
one versus type two errors; that is, whether the effect on 
consumer welfare is likely to be more damaging if the merger 
is erroneously approved versus whether it is erroneously 
blocked. For example, if a merger is approved even though the 
price increase would, in fact, outweigh the consumer benefits 
from a quality increase, the anticompetitive effects may be 
overcome by a timely market response. Any conclusion as to 
whether the merger would increase price should have also 
incorporated an analysis of entry barriers and supply 
responses. If the evidence for a post-merger supply response 
is relatively strong, the risk of erroneously approving the 
merger may be mitigated. In contrast, if the evidence is 
persuasive that post-merger supply responses are unlikely, 
one would be more reluctant to allow the merger to proceed 
because the likelihood that the market will discipline any 
unexpected price increase is relatively low and the risk of a 
poor outcome from an erroneously approved merger is 
correspondingly higher. 
Our discussion to this point has treated consumer 
preferences as homogeneous. In the context of this discussion, 
however, it is important to recognize that preferences over 
non-price characteristics may vary across consumers. For 
example, while some consumers may highly value an 
improvement in the orthopedic department of a healthcare 
group that will purportedly result from a merger, others may 
care only about the effect of the merger on the endocrinology 
or pediatric departments. In fact, since consumers may have 
very different preferences, a change in a product 
characteristic may be viewed as an increase in product quality 
by some consumers but a reduction in product quality by 
others. For example, the simplification of a software product 
that makes it more user-friendly may be of great value to some 
consumers, but reduce the desirability of the product for those 
consumers who used features that were hidden or eliminated 
by the simplification. These considerations do not arise in a 
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price-only model because, all else equal, consumers generally 
prefer lower prices over higher prices. 
Because consumers may have heterogeneous preferences 
over non-price factors, alleged anticompetitive conduct may 
hurt some consumers while benefitting others. In order to 
determine whether, on balance, the conduct in question is 
likely pro- or anticompetitive under a consumer-welfare 
standard, the decisionmaker must weigh the individual 
welfare of different consumers against each other in some 
manner. As a general proposition, economics provides no 
single “correct” way to define a social-welfare function that 
aggregates individual utilities or weighs them against one 
another. Indeed, in the absence of altruism, it is individually 
rational for each consumer to prefer a very simple social-
welfare function: give 100% weight to one’s own preferences 
and 0% weight to the preferences of others. Of course, those 
who care about friends, family, and even society at large may 
prefer a different social-welfare function that gives less weight 
to their own preferences and more to those of others. 
Pareto efficiency is a concept in the economics literature 
that can be used to determine whether a given outcome is 
unambiguously better than another.14 Specifically, a Pareto-
efficient outcome is one in which it is impossible to make at 
least one consumer better off without making at least one 
other consumer worse off. Applied to antitrust analyses, one 
might conclude that a given conduct is procompetitive if no 
consumers are worse off compared to the counterfactual 
outcome that would have occurred in the absence of the 
conduct in question, and some consumers are better off. 
Similarly, one might conclude that a given conduct is 
anticompetitive if no consumers are better off, and some are 
worse off, as compared to the counterfactual outcome.  
In a price-only model in which all consumers face the same 
price, this welfare standard corresponds to whether the 
conduct in question led to a higher or lower price, because 
generally speaking, consumers prefer lower prices to higher 
 
14 See VARIAN, supra note 6, at 225, 404–09 (explaining the concept of 
Pareto efficiency). 
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prices, holding product attributes constant.15 The obvious 
problem with relying on Pareto efficiency in a more general 
framework in which both price and non-price factors may 
change is that, due to heterogeneous consumer preferences for 
non-price product characteristics, it may be the rare case 
where (literally) all consumers are either worse or better off. 
If welfare effects are mixed across consumers, then the 
concept of Pareto efficiency offers little guidance as to 
whether, on balance, a given conduct is pro- or 
anticompetitive. 
A potentially more useful welfare concept from the 
economics literature is known as “compensating variations,” 
which applies the following thought experiment.16 For each 
consumer, compare their welfare given the conduct in 
question to their welfare in the counterfactual outcome that 
would have occurred in the absence of the given conduct. 
Calculate the amount of money that the consumer would need 
to receive, given the conduct, to make them indifferent 
between the two outcomes. For consumers harmed by the 
conduct, the money transfer would be positive, while the 
money transfer would be negative for consumers who 
benefitted from the conduct. If net money transfers across all 
consumers are positive, then, by the “compensating 
variations” theory one would conclude that the conduct is 
anticompetitive, while if net money transfers are negative, 
then one would conclude that the conduct is procompetitive. 
The use of compensating variations for measuring 
consumer-welfare effects is based on allocative efficiency.17 If 
there were a social planner who could engage in money 
transfers with consumers, then it would, in theory, be possible 
to make all consumers better off compared to the 
counterfactual outcome where the conduct in question had not 
occurred, when (and only when) net transfers are negative. 
Because monetary transfers are a standard unit of measure, 
 
15 See VARIAN, supra note 6, at 94–112. 
16 See VARIAN, supra note 6, at 160–63. 
17 See VARIAN, supra note 6, at 224–27. 
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this theoretical framework allows welfare to be compared 
across consumers with heterogeneous preferences. 
One important limitation of compensating variations is 
that it is a purely theoretical construct. In the real world, 
there is no social planner that is engaged in monetary 
transfers with consumers to offset the impact of a particular 
conduct. This means that, even if a given conduct were 
welfare-improving in the aggregate according to the theory of 
compensating variations, a significant portion of consumers 
might still be significantly worse off as a result of the conduct. 
What to do in this situation is open to debate. It may be 
reasonable to allow conduct that is generally procompetitive 
even if it results in some (limited) harm to a small group of 
consumers. However, depending on one’s view of the “optimal” 
social-welfare function, it may be harder to defend that 
position as the percentage of harmed consumers grows, or as 
the harm suffered by that group grows larger in magnitude. 
As noted earlier, economics is limited in its ability to offer 
guidance to decisionmakers when the effects of potentially 
anticompetitive conduct benefit some consumers while 
harming others. 
C. Effects Related to Consumer Demand for Products 
Other Than Those Directly at Issue 
From an economic perspective, effects unrelated to 
consumer demand for the products directly at issue raise 
essentially the same concerns as effects related to consumer 
demand for the products directly at issue. The main 
distinction between the two is the set of impacted consumers: 
effects unrelated to consumer demand for the set of products 
at issue will often impact a set of consumers largely distinct 
from those who are purchasing goods in the relevant antitrust 
market. 
When distinct groups are impacted by a given conduct, it 
may be the case that one group benefits while a different 
group is harmed. The fact that the consumers who benefit are 
distinct from those who are harmed does not preclude, in 
theory, applying the consumer-welfare standard. There are 
two practical challenges associated with adjudicating a case 
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in which the benefiting group is distinct from the harmed 
group, however. 
The first is the problem of the “slippery slope.” Once one 
opens for consideration the economic repercussions of any 
alleged conduct beyond its effects on the directly affected 
products (and directly affected consumers), those 
repercussions may ripple to a nearly endless potential set of 
effects. Naturally, not all such effects can be considered, as a 
practical matter—however the perfect should not be the 
enemy of the good. Acknowledging that there may be 
important positive or negative effects on consumers other 
than those in the directly-affected group should not open the 
analysis to all possible avenues of effect; but rather, as in any 
other antitrust analysis, evidence-based judgment must be 
applied to limit the analysis to the most important areas of 
consideration or most important ripple effects of an alleged 
conduct. 
The second practical challenge associated with 
adjudicating a case in which the benefiting group is distinct 
from the harmed group is the question of how to balance the 
welfare of two distinct groups of consumers. Economics has 
little to offer here, as elaborated above. In O’Bannon v. NCAA, 
for example, the court concluded that the value of amateurism 
to sports fans outweighed the cost to the student-athletes of 
being deprived of income they would otherwise presumably 
earn.18 That judgment, whether right or wrong, was not based 
on economic guidance regarding how the welfare of those two 
groups should be balanced. 
This issue of which set of consumers matters when 
considering welfare effects is analogous to the antitrust 
debate over whether “out-of-market” efficiencies should be 
included when evaluating the net welfare effects of a given 
conduct. In the merger context, the antitrust agencies 
generally disallow out-of-market efficiencies and instead take 
the view that competitive impacts should be separately 
 
18 O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1070, 1076–79 (9th Cir. 2015).  
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evaluated in each antitrust market.19 That is, procompetitive 
effects in one market cannot be used to offset anticompetitive 
effects in another market, although the Interagency Merger 
Guidelines do highlight that this is subject to prosecutorial 
discretion by the agencies.20 
Whether or not out-of-market efficiencies should be 
accepted is analogous to the issue discussed earlier of how to 
aggregate heterogeneous welfare effects across consumers. 
Depending on one’s view of the optimal social welfare 
function, it may be just as appropriate, or inappropriate, to 
offset pro- and anticompetitive effects across consumers 
purchasing in distinct antitrust markets as it is to offset pro- 
and anticompetitive effects across consumers who are 
purchasing in the same antitrust market but have 
heterogeneous preferences. 
In his address, Judge Ginsburg distinguishes consumer 
welfare concerns from other non-competitive public interest 
considerations.21 We understand that Judge Ginsburg 
believes that the former is the purview of antitrust, while the 
latter is not. From an economic perspective, this dichotomy 
may be difficult to defend.  
Considerations such as income or social inequality, 
ecological effects, or other factors mentioned by Judge 
Ginsburg,22 are not outside the scope of the consumer welfare 
standard from an economic perspective. On the contrary, they 
are squarely within it so long as consumers meaningfully care 
about these effects. Economics recognizes that, for example, 
income inequality could be detrimental to consumer welfare—
mostly because economics is essentially agnostic about what 
preferences determine consumer welfare. Within economics, 
 
19 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL 
MERGER GUIDELINES § 10 (2010). 
20 In particular, the Merger Guidelines note that the agencies may 
“consider efficiencies not strictly in the relevant market, but so inextricably 
linked with it that a partial divestiture or other remedy could not feasibly 
eliminate the anticompetitive effect in the relevant market without 
sacrificing the efficiencies in the other market[s].” See id. at § 10 n.14. 
21 Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 835–38. 
22 Id.  
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we take preferences as given. Dividing preferences into 
“antitrust relevant” and “antitrust irrelevant” groups runs the 
risk of attributing normative value to some preferences at the 
expense of others, rather than taking them as given. 
Even within a broadly conceived notion of consumer 
welfare, however, it need not be the case that all qualitative 
effects must be considered. As discussed earlier, how to 
aggregate consumer welfare across people is highly subjective 
with no correct answer (at least, none provided by economic 
science) of how this might be accomplished. One potential 
rationale for excluding non-competition public interest 
considerations is that they often involve welfare effects of 
consumers outside of the relevant antitrust market. If, for 
example, the benefits of reducing income inequality largely 
fall to consumers who do not purchase the product at issue, 
then such effects would have limited importance when 
applying a social welfare function that focuses on the welfare 
of within-market consumers. Thus, excluding such effects as 
beyond the purview of traditional antitrust analysis could be 
justified as a proxy for using a narrow definition of “relevant 
consumer.” 
We recognize, however, that there is a range of opinions 
regarding who is the relevant consumer about whose welfare 
antitrust should be concerned. Some believe that antitrust’s 
scope should be narrowly focused on consumers in the 
antitrust market at issue, while others take a more expansive 
view.23 A narrower definition of “relevant consumer” results 
in the potential exclusion of certain effects such as social and 
political considerations—a position more closely aligned with 
 
23 See The Consumer Welfare Standard in Antitrust: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Antitrust, Consumer Prot. and Consumer Rights of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 3 (2017) (opening statement of 
Professor Carl Shapiro) (advocating for a consumer welfare standard that 
focuses on harm to trading parties on the other side of the market).  See also 
Tim Wu, After Consumer Welfare, Now What? The “Protection of 
Competition Standard” in Practice, ANTITRUST CHRON., Apr. 2018, at 12, 18–
19 (advocating for the protection of the competitive process generally). See 
generally ANTITRUST CHRON., Apr. 2018 (including several articles 
discussing “Hipster Antitrust”). 
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Judge Ginsburg’s view on the range of effects that should be 
properly included in an antitrust analysis.24 
Without a doubt, weighing the benefits to one set of 
consumers against costs to others is a fraught exercise. It is 
not clear, however, that the challenge facing the 
decisionmaker is greater when the winners and losers are 
entirely separate consumer groups than when they fall within 
the same consumer group, but with varying effects for 
different consumers. As a result, it is not clear that ruling out 
“non-traditional” considerations on the grounds that they are 
outside the realm of traditional antitrust analysis is justified 
by the observation that the tradeoffs are hard to make or are 
potentially subjective. Indeed, ruling out such considerations 
may result in ignoring effects that are central to social welfare 
determinations, and refusing to consider them may amount to 
promoting tractability at the expense of consumer welfare. 
As noted earlier, it may well be that the evidence in a given 
case does not permit a disciplined and rigorous consideration 
of effects outside of those directly impacting the consumers in 
the market at issue. In such cases, these more nebulous 
effects, while potentially of great importance to consumers, 
may be best addressed in a different venue than the antitrust 
court, consistent with Judge Ginsburg’s view.25 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Qualitative evidence and effects pose significant 
challenges, but economists must, and routinely do, apply 
rigorous, evidence-based analysis to overcome them. In 
making judgments about countervailing effects of alleged 
anticompetitive mergers or other conducts, we do not serve 
the objective of maximizing consumer welfare by establishing 
a rule of ignoring certain factors that may affect consumer 
welfare. Indeed, one may argue that by ignoring them we may 
in some cases affirmatively expunge from the consumer 
welfare calculus factors that are central to it, to the detriment 
of the goals of maximizing consumer welfare. 
 
24 See generally Ginsburg, supra note 1. 
25 Id.  
